The Road Taken: Origins and Evolution of Employment Systems in Emerging Companies by Baron, James N et al.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection 
1996 
The Road Taken: Origins and Evolution of Employment Systems in 
Emerging Companies 
James N. Baron 
Stanford University 
M. Diane Burton 
Cornell University, mdb238@cornell.edu 
Michael T. Hannan 
Stanford University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the Human Resources Management Commons, Labor Relations Commons, Organizational 
Behavior and Theory Commons, and the Technology and Innovation Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
The Road Taken: Origins and Evolution of Employment Systems in Emerging 
Companies 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Drawing on a unique archive of qualitative and quantitative data describing 100 Bay Area high 
technology firms within their first decade, this paper examines the models of employment relations 
espoused by company founders and bow those models shaped the evolution of human resource 
management within their organizations. Information gleaned from interviews suggests that founders and 
others involved in designing and launching these companies had blueprints for the employment relation 
that varied along three key dimensions: the primary basis of employee attachment and motivation, the 
primary means for controlling and coordinating work, and the primary criterion emphasized in selection. 
Based on combinations of these three dimensions, firms in our sample cluster fall into one of four distinct 
types, which we label the star, factory, engineering, and commitment models. Multivariate statistical 
analyses document how the founder's employment model shaped the subsequent adoption and timing of 
various human resource policies and documents over these companies' early histories, as well as the 
speed with which the first full-time human resource manager was appointed The findings are strongly 
suggestive of complementarities and a tendency toward internal consistency among dimensions of 
human resource management, and of strong path dependence in the evolution of employment systems in 
organizations. Some implications of these findings for transactions cost perspectives on the employment 
relationship are discussed. 
Keywords 
employment relations, management, organizations, bureaucracy, high technology, human resource 
management 
Disciplines 
Human Resources Management | Labor Relations | Organizational Behavior and Theory | Technology and 
Innovation 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Baron, J. N., Burton, M. D. & Hannan, M. T. (1996). The road taken: Origins and evolution of employment 
systems in emerging companies. Retrieved [insert date] from Cornell University, ILR School site: 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/254/ 
Required Publisher Statement 
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Industrial and 
Corporate Changefollowing peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version is available online 
at: http://icc.oxfordjournals.org/. 
Final paper published as Baron, J. N., Burton, M. D. & Hannan, M. T. (1996). The road taken: Origins and 
evolution of employment systems in emerging companies. Industrial and Corporate Change, 5(2), 
239-275. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/254 
The Road Taken: Origins and Evolution 
of Employment Systems in Emerging 
Companies 
JAMES N. BARON, M. DIANE BURTON AND 
MICHAEL T. HANNAN 
(Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA) 
Drawing on a unique archive of qualitative and quantitative data describing 100 
Bay Area high technology firms within their first decade, this paper examines the 
models of employment relations espoused by company founders and bow those models 
shaped the evolution of human resource management within their organizations. 
Information gleaned from interviews suggests that founders and others involved in 
designing and launching these companies had blueprints for the employment relation 
that varied along three key dimensions: the primary basis of employee attachment and 
motivation, the primary means for controlling and coordinating work, and the pri-
mary criterion emphasized in selection. Based on combinations of these three dimen-
sions, firms in our sample cluster fall into one of four distinct types, which we label 
the star, factory, engineering, and commitment models. Multivariate statistical ana-
lyses document how the founder's employment model shaped the subsequent adoption 
g and timing of various human resource policies and documents over these companies' 
- early histories, as well as the speed with which the first full-time human resource 
? manager was appointed The findings are strongly suggestive of complementarities and 
§ a tendency toward internal consistency among dimensions of human resource manage-
ment, and of strong path dependence in the evolution of employment systems in organi-
| zations. Some implications of these findings for transactions cost perspectives on the 
| employment relationship are discussed 
f 
* 1. Introduction 
0 A central concern of transaction cost economics (TCE) has been to under-
« stand how employment relationships and governance structures develop 
J around productive activities. Williamson's (1975) operating hypothesis has 
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been that organizational forms and employment systems develop so as to 
minimize the transaction costs and hold-up problems facing employers and 
employees. These issues arise primarily from relationship-specific skills and 
investments (and the small numbers bargaining they induce ex post), task 
interdependencies, opportunism and informational imperfections that make 
spot contracting or contingent claims contracting infeasible or very costly. 
In more recent work, Williamson (1992) has acknowledged the prevalence 
of organizational inertia and path-dependent development, which have been 
documented in the empirical literature on organizations (Barnett and 
Carroll, 1995). However, he argues that inertia and path dependence likely 
reflect either an absence of strong competitive pressures (the scope condi-
tions under which the hypothesis of transaction cost minimization is most 
intended to apply) or a situation in which the adjustment costs of getting to 
'first best' exceed the anticipated incremental gains. 
Williamsonian reasoning has stimulated the development of typologies of 
organizational employment systems. Spot contracting through markets is 
thought to be optimal when work is independent and easy to monitor, when 
the skills involved are general, and when, accordingly, employees or employ-
ers have little room for opportunism. When the parties cannot contract ex 
ante for what is to be done or circumvent problems that arise from small 
numbers and/or monopoly power, markets fail. Then bureaucracies are 
preferable, because they bind the interests of both employer and employee 
through long-term relationships and rely on rules and monitoring devices to 
discourage opportunism (Williamson, 1975, 1981). When casks are 
extremely interdependent and/or difficult to monitor, team or 'clan' 
employment systems relying more on cultural controls (peer monitoring and 
internalization of values) are superior (Ouchi, 1980). Some extant empirical 
evidence supports the notion that the design of human resource systems and 
the management of employment relationships in organizations is broadly 
consistent with these predictions of transactions cost economics (PfefJer and 
Cohen, 1984; Baron etal., 1986; Cohen and Pfeffer, 1986). 
However, several ambiguities complicate the process of subjecting TCE to 
rigorous empirical test. One applies to any approach that, like TCE, empha-
sizes comparative statics. It concerns the time-frame over which transaction 
cost minimization is expected to occur. Indeed, if an organization exists in a 
stable equilibrium or can continually adjust its employment practices in 
response to changes in its external environment and internal constraints, 
then matters are rather straightforward. However, it seems quite likely that 
organization employment systems are characterized by considerable path 
dependence. Hannan and Freeman (1977,1984) argued that inertial tenden-
cies in organizations are most acute in the 'core' of organizations, where the 
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benefits of reproducibility and legitimacy are greatest and where, because of 
interdependencies, even a minor change has potentially enormous ramifica-
tions for other parts of the organization. For reasons that are outlined in our 
companion paper (Hannan et al., 1996), altering the premises of employees' 
relationships with the organization, as well as the specific HR practices that 
undergird those relationships, is likely to be extraordinarily contentious, 
which might explain the oft-noted difficulty of achieving large-scale change 
in HR systems (Pfeflfer, 1994). Indeed, from an economic theory standpoint, 
a critical objective in structuring employment relationships is establishing a 
reputation, vis-d-vis current and prospective employees (Simon, 1951; Kreps, 
1996). There might be an inherent tension between developing and main-
taining a strong reputation among employees in the labor market, which is 
predicated on continuity and stability in employment practices, and con-
tinually realigning the organization's HR activities in light of changing 
internal and external circumstances. 
In this paper, we wish to focus on a second ambiguity that complicates 
efforts to test the implications of TCE reasoning for employment relation-
ships. It concerns the level of analysis at which transaction-cost minimization 
should be expected to occur. Evidence of transaction cost economizing will 
be easier to discern when organizations manage a set of completely separable 
(i.e. non-interdependent) activities, which can each be structured and con-
trolled through a distinctive combination of employment policies and prac-
tices, than when there are strong technological, normative, or other 
interdependencies among activities that necessitate common policies across 
disparate tasks and labor forces. Moreover, if there are inherent complemen-
tarities among sets of human resource practices, then organizational design-
ers might have limited ability to pick and choose among specific policies in 
structuring employment relations and governance practices. Instead, they 
might have to select from among a limited number of human resource 'sys-
tems' that represent menus or clusters of human resource practices. 
Similarly, there may be what (Williamson, 1975) terms 'atmospheric' 
benefits associated with organizing a whole menu of activities through a 
common set of organizational procedures and routines (e.g. a single organi-
zational culture or set of employment practices). For instance, structuring 
pay, promotion and other employment practices very differently across 
diverse occupations or departments within an organization, even if seem-
ingly warranted based on human capital or other considerations, might gen-
erate so much counterproductive dissent internally or illegitimacy externally 
as to outweigh the benefits. Accordingly, a consistent set of employment 
practices that might appear suboptimal for each of a set of activities might 
be optimal (or nearly so) for the organization as a whole. 
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Baron and Kreps (in press) suggest at least three reasons to expect 
employment practices within organizations to cluster into consistent bun-
dles. First, as Milgrom and Roberts (1995) note in discussing the Lincoln 
Electric Company, there are some obvious technical complementarities 
among particular HR practices. For instance a start-up firm intending to 
invest heavily in training its workers will benefit disproportionately from 
carefully screening applicants and from adopting practices to reduce 
turnover. Conversely, companies having screened carefully and/or imple-
mented turnover-reduction mechanisms are likely to benefit disproportion-
ately from investments in training employees. 
A second reason for expecting consistency involves the psychology of per-
ception and cognition. Psychological theory and research indicate that mes-
sages are more salient and recalled better when the multiple stimuli being 
transmitted are simple and support the same message. Internal consistency, 
which also entails simplicity (i.e. everything follows the same basic princi-
ples), should aid employees in learning about what is expected of them and 
what they can expect in turn. This is also likely to offer several benefits to 
the employer, including: superior matching or sorting between potential 
employees and the job opportunities offered by the firm; reduced need for 
monitoring employees' activities or clarifying ambiguous or contradictory 
expectations; and greater ability to provide long-term incentives and career 
development because employees clearly understand what is expected and 
valued. 
Baron and Kreps (in press) suggest a third category of reasons for expect-
ing consistency in HR practices: social forces. External consistency—that is, 
congruence between a firm's employment system and external social norms 
and preconceptions—presumably facilitates learning. Both parties to the 
employment relation are likely to find it easier to comprehend the nature of 
the relationship when its employment practices consistently (and symboli-
cally) mimic previously-internalized codes of conduct from other contexts, 
whether these patterns are akin to an anonymous marketplace (dog-eat-dog) 
or a family relationship (mutual caring). By this logic, for instance, it would 
be difficult for a set of founders who shared strong kinship or long-standing 
friendship bonds to establish a company whose personnel policies reflected 
either a Draconian or an arms-length posture vis-A~vis employees. Similarly, 
personnel policies that encourage employees to identify themselves as mem-
bers of a corporate 'family' (long-term employment, open door policies, sug-
gestion systems, etc.) would not seem to mesh well with other practices that 
convey the message that employees are interchangeable, expendable, or sim-
ply a cost that the firm must bear. 
According to Baron and Kreps, the same arguments regarding consistency 
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among HR practices also apply to the issue of how differentiation or incon-
sistency in treatment among subgroups within an organization will afreet 
transaction costs. They note that pressures toward uniform treatment are 
likely to be especially acute in organizations with: (a) high technical interde-
pendence; (b) a labor force that is socially and demographically homoge-
neous; (c) a strong unified 'culture'; (d) an internal labor market and/or 
extensive job rotation and lateral transferring; and (e) a broader social envi-
ronment that does not legitimate differential treatment among segments of 
the labor force or the society (also see Baron and Pfeffer, 1994). 
These arguments regarding consistency in human resource management 
posit various benefits to employers and/or employees from organizing 
employment relationships around consistent HR premises and practices and 
by drawing on models of social relationships from other settings. If correct, 
these arguments imply that, over time, some advantages in terms of perfor-
mance or survival should accrue to organizations whose employment rela-
tionships are internally consistent and/or structured to mimic other social 
systems with which their employees have experience. However, another 
explanation for why we might expect to observe consistency in HR systems 
is less instrumental and more cognitive-1—namely, it may be difficult for 
individuals, including those who design and manage organizations, to 
espouse and enforce contradictory principles. Robert Frank (1988), among 
others, has noted some important economic consequences of the psychologi-
cal tendency toward cognitive consistency, both in the beliefs we hold and 
in the codes of behavior we bring to different economic transactions. 
According to his argument, an employer wishing to develop a reputation for 
trustworthiness with suppliers and customers, for instance, will find this 
harder to do unless she consistently acts in a benevolent and trustworthy 
fashion (e.g. in dealing with other constituencies, such as employees). Simi-
larly, psychological theories of consistency suggest that it creates cognitive 
strain to espouse discrepant beliefs, such as the view that employees are 
good, knowledgeable and trustworthy alongside the view that they require 
close monitoring and powerful incentives to be motivated to comply with 
the firm's objectives. This line of reasoning suggests that consistency among 
HR practices—and between employment relations and other types of social 
relations—may simply reflect a basic psychological tendency but not neces-
sarily entail any implications for economic performance. 
This brief overview suggests several potentially useful foci for research 
on how employment relationships become established in the early years of 
organizations. One concerns the degree of 'alignment' of the human resource 
policies and practices of organizations with their technologies and business 
strategies. Evidence on whether alignment is evident at the inception of 
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firms, or instead seems to be achieved gradually over time, might speak to 
the time-frame over which entrepreneurs are seeking to minimize transac-
tion costs. We take up this issue in our companion paper in this issue 
(Hannan et al.y 1996). A second useful focus of research concerns the impli-
cations of 'complementarities' and the need for internal consistency—both 
among specific HR practices (e.g. recruitment, compensation, performance 
evaluation, training, job design, etc.) and in the treatment of different seg-
ments of the work-force—for the design of human resource systems. To the 
extent that there are complementarities among specific HR practices and 
interdependencies (of a technical or social character) among segments of an 
organization's work-force, the problem of selecting and implementing the 
optimal governance regime might be more complicated than a stylized TGE 
story would imply. It is this issue that is explored in this paper. 
There has been much more writing about the prevalence and virtues of 
internal consistency in HR systems than careful empirical study of the mat-
ter. There are a few noteworthy exceptions to this generalization. For 
instance, MacDuffie's (1995) work on the worldwide automobile industry 
documents a tendency for firms employing so-called high commitment work 
systems to avail themselves of an interrelated bundle of HR practices. An 
interesting longitudinal study of production lines in the steel industry (Ich-
niowski et al., 1993) shows that productivity was enhanced by adopting var-
ious HR innovations that are generally associated with high commitment 
work systems, but that the returns to adopting a given practice were 
enhanced when other elements of a high commitment work system were 
either adopted simultaneously or already in place within the establishment. 
It should be obvious that these issues are difficult to study without know-
ing a great deal about how an organization evolves over time, particularly 
about key decisions and developments in the early years of a company that 
might have momentous consequences for how it evolves and performs over 
time. In other words, it is not clear whether meaningful theoretical infer-
ences can be drawn from most empirical studies of employment systems in 
organizations, which tend to be either cross-sectional comparisons across a 
sample of fairly long-lived 'survivor' organizations or case studies of what 
has transpired in a particular setting. Most extant research on HR systems 
focuses on relatively mature and long-lived organizations in seeking to iden-
tify the nature and benefits of HR alignment and internal consistency. Yet if 
consistency among HR practices is important, and if organizational design-
ers seek to capitalize (either intentionally or unintentionally) on models 
of social relationships drawn from other settings (other firms, the family, 
educational institutions, etc.), this should be particularly evident when 
organizations are assembling their employment systems in their early years. 
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The Road Taken 
Specifically, we should be able to find evidence not only in what the archi-
tects of nascent organizations say about what they were trying to achieve and 
what models they had in mind, but also in how their organizations evolved 
in the early years—for instance, whether the development of particular HR 
practices corresponds to a clear organizational blueprint and exhibits a logic 
of internal consistency. 
The difficulty of obtaining the requisite life history data on organizations, 
particularly information about their formative years, might help explain 
why these issues have not received more attention in prior empirical research 
addressing employment relationships and/or transaction cost economizing. 
This paper reports some of the preliminary research findings from the Stan-
ford Project on Emerging Companies (SPEC), an ongoing large-scale study 
designed to gather precisely this kind of information about early organiza-
tion-building activities. Our goals in this paper are more descriptive than 
explanatory; we exploit the rich information we have obtained on the process 
of organization-building from interviews with founders, chief executives and 
senior HR officials, which describe the timing of various crucial events in 
the process of creating the firm's governance systems and also the imagery 
and intentions of the firm's architects. We use this information to identify 
several distinct modek for organizing employment and work that recur 
within our sample of high technology start-ups. By examining how these 
modeb are conceptualized, constructed and articulated in the early years of 
start-up firms, we gain some insight into how organizational designers 
approach the issue of consistency and complementarities in human resource 
management and the extent to which they are seeking to develop employ-
ment systems that transcend particular HR practices and occupations within 
the firm. In our companion paper in this volume (Hannan et aJ.t 1996), we 
explore some of the determinants of founders' human resource modeb and 
document how those modeb profoundly influence subsequent organizational 
evolution. 
2. Brief Overview of SPEC 
To control for labor market and environmental conditions, we focus on firms 
in one region and a particular sector of economic activity: technology-ori-
ented companies in California's Silicon Valley. The continuing flow of high 
tech start-ups in the Silicon Valley area provides many opportunities to col-
lect information on the early history of interesting firms. One goal of thb 
research b to understand how early decbions affect future outcomes, which 
necessitates information about the earliest days of the organization. We 
assumed that individuab could only reasonably recall fairly recent informa-
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tion; thus, we limited our study to firms that were no mote than ten years of 
age at the time we asked them to participate in the project. A second project 
goal is to understand how human resource systems are established. We 
assumed that organizations need to be of a minimum size before feeing a 
need for any formal systems of practices; accordingly, firms in our study 
needed to have at least ten employees when the study commenced (in 1994). 
To identify the population, we purchased extracts from two commercial 
databases on technology companies: Rich's Everyday Sales Prospecting Guide 
and CorpTecb. From these sources, we drew a stratified random sample of 
high technology firms with headquarters in Silicon Valley, oversampling 
young firms and large firms (Burton, 1995). The firms we targeted for study 
are concentrated in computer hardware and/or software, telecommunications 
(including networking equipment), medical/biological technologies and 
semiconductors. Foreign-owned firms were excluded from the population, as 
were operating units of other organizations, because we were concerned that 
the structures and practices of such enterprises would reflect broader influ-
ences whose effects we could not adequately control. 
With these restrictions, we identified 676 firms that met our selection 
criteria as of spring 1994. We approached 250 of these firms; 100 agreed to 
participate in the study.1 Happily, there was little evidence of systematic 
bias in response to our request for participation (see below). Figure 1 reports 
the 'target' composition of firms sought through our stratified sampling 
plan, as well as the age and size distribution of firms in our sample. 
Data Collection 
Trained MBA and doctoral students conducted semi-structured interviews 
with the CEO and the key informants that s/he had nominated to provide 
information about company history and human resource practices. Infor-
mants about company history and human resource management were also 
asked to complete pencil and paper surveys and return them to us prior to 
being interviewed. (For detailed information on the data gathered in each 
firm, see Burton, 1995). These surveys solicited details about the firm and 
its history; this information was used to guide the interviews. 
(i) Founders were asked to recount the details of the founding: how the 
founding team was assembled, the original business plan, the planned 
' During the tummer of 1995, several bundled more firms were invited to participate in SPEC, and to 
date an additional 72 firm* have agreed to do so, bringing the total sample up to 172 companies. The 
fim 100 companies, which were studied during the summer of 1994, will be revisited in .the summer of 
1996 to update their human resource activities, organintional performance and other key information. 
TbtRomdTskm 
HuBBpat of amployaaa 
10 to 24 25 to 49 501098 100K>249 250 <x 
Samprng Total n in Oaslrad Samplen 
Group PopulaMon %ofSawpla Comadad Companlaa 
A 149 60% 149 67 
B 107 20% 66 19 
C 146 10% 15 9 
O . 214 10% 21 8 
PKWM LSPBCwmpiing fame and iqponte me. 
(ii) 
(iii) 
core competencies of the firm, sources of initial capital, initial staffing 
and initial employment practices. They were queried about their own 
professional background, external partners and stakeholders and 
whether there was. a dear organizational Vision' or blueprint in creat-
ing the enterprise (and, if so, where it came from). Founders were also 
asked to report on the firm's current structure and practices and to 
identify the timing and nature of major organizational changes or 
'milestones'. Founder interviews typically lasted 60 minutes. Although 
interviewers were given a template and set of probes for these inter-
views, the interviews tended to follow a direction set by the founder. 
Following a similar semi-structured interview format, CEOs were 
asked to provide detailed information on the firm's current strategy, 
structure, business environment and management challenges. These 
face-to-fece interviews typically lasted 45 minutes. 
Senior managers with responsibility for human resources were asked to 
provide extensive infonnation about the firm's past and current 
employment practices. Human resources interviews typically lasted 90 
minutes. 
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TABLE 1. Age and site distribution for SPEC participating companies 
Number of employees 
Founding 
1984 
1963 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Total 
Year 10 to 24 
2 
3 
0 
0 
2 
0 
4 
3 
2 
16 
25 to 49 
2 
1 
2 
0 
2 
1 
4 
2 
1 
15 
50 to 99 
0 
2 
0 
5 
6 
4 
1 
3 
1 
22 
100 to 249 
3 
1 
2 
7 
12 
4 
0 
1 
0 
30 
250 or more 
6 
2 
4 
1 
2 
0 
1 
1 
0 
17 
Total 
13 
9 
8 
13 
24 
9 
10 
10 
4 
100 
We also gathered documents from informants that record the history of 
the firm, its organization, and its personnel practices whenever possible (e.g. 
organization charts, initial business plans, personnel manuals, company 
forms and documents). In addition, we gathered publicly-available informa-
tion about each of the firms in the study using a number of on-line database 
services, including Lexis/Nexis, Dialog Business Connection and ABI 
Inform, as well as annual reports and lOKs for each of the public firms. For 
publicly-traded firms, we obtained a prospectus from the initial public stock 
offering. 
Potential limitations of the SPEC design. As a source of baseline data 
on the early organizing activities of new enterprises, we believe the SPEC 
project provides a unique source of data, containing richer quantitative and 
qualitative information on a larger, more comprehensive and representative 
sample of organizations than any we have encountered in the literatures on 
organization-building and entrepreneurship. At the same time, we are well 
aware of several potential limitations of the SPEC study design. First, we 
have gathered information about early organization-building activities by 
asking key individuals involved in those activities for their retrospective rec-
ollections, and such recollections are always subject to potential biases. Sec-
ond, we have asked founders and senior managers to characterize their 
organizations and human resource practices, but there is no guarantee that 
their accounts correspond to the reality experienced by employees. Third, 
although we intentionally limited our sample to organizations that are still 
quite young (a median age of under six years, with 24% being four years old 
or younger), there is nonetheless the possibility of some sort of survivor bias 
characterizing our sample because we are only informed about the early 
Tbe Road Taken 
histories, employment models, and organization-building activities of com-
panies that have endured to make it into our sample. These are important 
concerns that deserve careful considerations accordingly, after reporting our 
results, we briefly assess whether and how such limitations might cloud our 
analysis and conclusions. 
3. Founders' Models of Employment Systems 
In this paper, we examine the actual employment practices adopted by orga-
nizations in their formative years. We also examine how those who created 
organizations conceived of the employment relationship. It is arguably those 
conceptions, as much as the specific human resource practices adopted by 
companies in their infancy, that should influence the subsequent evolution 
of organizational arrangements and employment practices within their 
companies. After all, when organizations are still very young and small, they 
might vary less in the particular HR practices they have put in place than in 
the prtmises that guide how they manage the work-force, which become 
institutionalized in organizational structures and practices at a later point in 
time. 
Each founder in the SPEC sample was asked whether or not he or she had 
'an organizational model or blueprint in mind when [you] founded the com-
pany'. (A companion question regarding the present was asked of the current 
CEO in each firm.) Roughly two-thirds of the founders were able to articu-
late some kind of HR blueprint, with almost half expressing a very clear 
organizational model, sometimes citing a specific organization as an illustra-
tion of what they wanted their firm to look like (or not to look like). Burton 
(1995) describes the wide variety of archetypes on which these founders 
drew in describing their organizational blueprints, ranging from the 
academy, to Japanese organizations, to scholarly models of management (e.g. 
MacGcegor's [I960} Theory X and Theory Y), to a widely-shared image of 
'the typical Silicon Valley start-up'. Others, steadfastly disavowed the notion 
of having a clear organizational model ex ante. As one founder put it: 'Mod-
els are a source of failure for start-ups. You have to become a successful com-
pany first, then create your own model. Even the celebrated [Hewlett 
Packard} principles were written twenty years after the company was 
started.' 
Upon analyzing the detailed interview transcripts obtained from each 
founder, we identified three recurring dimensions along which their images 
varied regarding how work and employment should be organized: the pri-
mary basis of organizational attachment; the primary means for controlling 
and coordinating work; and the primary criterion to be emphasized in 
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selecting employees. Along each of these dimensions, in turn, we found that 
founders' blueprints tended to cluster into one of three distinct categories. 
We briefly summarize each of the three dimensions and its constituent sub-
categories:2 
Attachment 
The first dimension along which founders' models vary concerns the primary 
basis of attachment (and retention) of employees. Three different bases of 
attachment were articulated by founders in recalling their organizational 
blueprints, which we label love, work and money. 
Some founders indicated that they envisioned that creating a strong fam-
ily-like feeling and an intense emotional bond with employees would inspire 
superior effort and increase the chances of retaining highly-sought employ-
ees over long periods of time, thereby avoiding the frequent mobility of key 
technical personnel that plagues Silicon Valley start-ups. One founder 
stated: 
I chink people should be treated as human beings, as real people. And 
really care for them. We axe still pretty much like family. We try to keep 
as much of that as possible even as the company is bigger. That's one thing 
I learned from HP {Hewlett-Packard]. Bill Hewlett still flipped hamburg-
ers for us at the company picnic. 
This quote nicely captures the familial associations underpinning this 
vision—the company picnic as a surrogate for the family barbecue, and the 
CEO (Bill Hewlett, in the anecdote) as 'Dad'. Thus, what binds the 
employee to the firm in this model is, simply put, love—an intense emo-
tional sense of personal belonging and identification with others in the com-
pany, comparable to a family. 
A large number of firms in the sample pursue cutting-edge technology, 
and for their employees a primary motivator is the desire to work at the 
technological frontier. Recognizing this, many of the founders responses 
reveal that they presumed that providing opportunities for interesting and 
challenging work would be the basis for attracting, motivating, and (per-
haps) retaining employees. Here, the employees were not expected to be 
loyal to the firm, or the boss, or even co-workers per se, but instead to the 
project. As one founder put it: 
2
 Note that we did not structure the interviews explicitly around these three dimensions or their sub-
categories, as these emerged after we had gathered, coded and analysed the interview transcripts. In other 
words, founders and CEOs were noc asked to classify their models along these dimensions or into the 
specific subcategories but instead to provide an open-ended description of their organizational blueprint 
and its rationale, which we then coded after the fact. 
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We wanted to assemble teams of people who are turned on by difficult 
problems. The emphasis was to build an environment of individuals who 
are performance driven, achievement oriented, customer focused, feel rela-
tively at ease to join and disband from specific teams, skilled at interdisci-
plinary problem solving irrespective of culture or discipline. 
Finally, other founders told us that they regarded the employment relation-
ship as a simple exchange of labor for money. One founder put this bluntly: 
[My] model is basically 'you work, you get paid.' With an assembly 
type business there is not a lot of engineering or white-collar workers 
requiring complex HR benefits or policies. We're not interested in the soft, 
warm, fuzzy stuff. Of course, we also don't want to be running a sweat 
shop. 
Basis of Control 
A second, related distinction in founders' models or blueprints concerns the 
principal means of controlling and coordinating work. The most common 
blueprint involves extensive reliance on peer or cultural control. One founder 
put this as follows: 'In my mind and probably in (the co-founder's}, mind 
was that we would be a very open, horizontal company with an emphasis on 
teamwork and all decisions made by consensus. Employees wear whatever 
they want, work whenever they want.' It is taken for granted that employees 
would work long hours, and peer pressure will presumably ensure that this 
is done and that the hours are spent working on useful endeavors. Not sur-
prisingly, founders who espoused this view also were likely to speak about 
the importance of socializing employees to ensure that they understood the 
directions in which their efforts should be aimed. 
Other founders recalled that their intention was to rely on professional con-
trol, even if they did not explicitly use this terminology. It is clear from their 
responses that these founders took it for granted that workers were commit-
ted to excellence in their work and were able to perform at high levels 
because they had been professionally socialized to do so. (Not surprisingly, 
this model tends to be accompanied by an emphasis on recruitment of high-
potential individuals from elite institutions.) In this model, the emphasis is 
on autonomy and independence, rather than on enculturation. One founder 
told us: 
Scientists like autonomy and independence. I value it myself and it's 
important to make sure that they have that. They feel the environment is 
exciting and that the leadership is there to provide the kind of place where 
their career is constantly renewing and growing. This essentially is most of 
my work—to see that they reach their maximum potential to grow. 
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Another founder explained: 
I give people a lot of autonomy. You perform for me, I don't care if you 
ever show up for work . . . So I put a lot more out there and gave more 
responsibility and accountability to the people and didn't monitor on a day 
to day basis. I truly believe that's the right style in business today. 
Finally, a third group of founders espoused a more traditional view of con-
trol as being embedded in formal procedures and systems. The following 
excerpts from two founder interviews illustrate this perspective well: 
We're not hierarchical as much as we are procedures, methodologies, and 
systems. I really try to see that everybody in the company maintains proce-
dures rather than just hand wave and do things any way. We don't want to 
be so hierarchical as to be startling, nor do we want to be so flat as to have 
everybody poking into everybody else's business. 
We run very much on a TQM philosophy. We make sure that things are 
documented, have job descriptions for people, project descriptions, and 
pretty rigorous project management techniques. 
Selection 
The third source of variation in founders' organizational blueprints, closely 
related to the preceding two, concerns the primary basis for selecting 
employees to join the firm. Some founders seemed to think of the firm in 
terms of bundles of tasks that needed to be carried out, seeking employees to 
carry out those tasks effectively. Time and money tend to be the paramount 
concerns here, so the focus was on selecting employees who could be 
brought on board and be up to speed as soon as possible and who would not 
decimate the founder's wallet or purse. As one founder put it, 'it's not who 
you know or what you do politically, but what you can achieve technically'. 
In these cases, the founders envisioned selecting employees who possessed 
the skills and experience needed to accomplish some immediate task(s). 
In other cases, founders seemed to be focused less on immediate and well-
defined tasks than on a series of projects (often not yet even envisioned) 
through which employees would move over time. Accordingly, their focus 
in selection was on long-term potential, rather than on specific skills or rele-
vant vocational experience. One founder articulated this point of view: 
'Given the choice between a smart person and an experienced one I'll always 
take the smart person. You can't give someone smarts, but you can give 
them experience.' These founders often also spoke of the importance of repu-
tation, network ties, and other intangible assets in evaluating potential 
employees. 
Finally, another group of founders reported that they focused primarily on 
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values or cultural fit. Like the previous group, these founders were concerned 
about the long-term, rather than specific short-term personnel needs, but 
they put heavy emphasis on how a prospective hire would connect with 
others in the organization: 'At the start we were seeking people with a long-
term focus—no Valley job hoppers. And we were as concerned with how 
everyone would fit together as we were with technical ability.' 
Relationships Among the Three Dimensions 
Not surprisingly, these three dimensions underlying founders' conceptions 
of the employment system are not independent. In fact, although we have 
classified founders into three types on each of the three dimensions, thereby 
yielding 27 possible combinations, 71% of the observations for which we 
were able to code all three dimensions clustered in just three of the cells: a 
cell combining attachment to work, professional control, and selection based. 
on potential (16 firms); another combining attachment to work, peer con-
trol, and selection based on specific tasks (17 firms); and a third combining 
attachment through love or emotion, peer control, and selection based on 
cultural fit (16 firms). The next most populous cells are those involving 
formal organizational controls and selection for specific skills or tasks, 
involving either attachment through money (6 firms) or through the nature 
of the work (5 firms). 
Based on this clustering, we identified four pure-type employment mod-
els, reflecting combinations of the three dimensions (Table 2). We use the 
label 'star' to refer to the model that involves challenging work, autonomy 
and professional control, and selection of elite personnel based on long-term 
potential. We use the 'engineering' label for the blueprint combining a 
focus on challenging work, peer group control, and selection based on spe-
cific task abilities. We refer to the blueprint relying on emotional/familial 
attachments of employees to the organization, selection based on cultural fit, 
and peer group control as the 'commitment' model. Finally, the 'factory' 
model is predicated on purely monetary motivations, conttol and coordina-
tion through formal organization and close managerial oversight, and selec-
tion of employees to perform pre-specified tasks. That label is intended to 
capture the similarity between this model and the traditional factory system 
under early industrial capitalism, which treated employees as factor inputs, 
preserved discretion of the owner, and relied on a combination of pecuniary 
rewards, close supervisory oversight, and technical or bureaucratic controls 
over employees. It also conveniently captures the contemporary pejorative 
connotation from the employee's perspective, as in the description of a non-
manufacturing workplace as a 'factory'. 
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TABLE 2. Four Pure-Type Employment Models, Based on Three Dimensions1 
Attachment 
Work 
Work 
Love 
Money 
Dimensions 
Selection 
Potential 
Taik 
Values 
Taak 
Coordination/Control 
Professional 
Peer 
Peer 
Managerial 
Employment model 
STAR 
ENGINEERING 
COMMITMENT 
FACTORY 
Tirim that did not correspond to pure type* were assigned to an employment model according to the fol-
lowing rules: (i) love' as a basis of attachment indicates a commitment model, regardless of selection cri-
terion ot basis of control; (ii) money as a basis of attachment indicates a factory model; (iii) work as a 
basis of attachment combined with professional control indicates a star model, regardless of selection cri-
terion; (iv) work as a basis of attachment without professional control indicates an engineering model. 
The fact that these three conceptual dimensions—the primary basis of 
attachment, the primary criterion for selecting employees and the primary 
axis of control and coordination—are interdependent is not a surprise. 
Rather, the strong association among them is itself suggestive of consistency 
and complementarities among dimensions of human resource management. 
Recall that we noted three bases for consistency among HR practices: eco-
nomic or technical complementarities (doing X increases the returns from 
doing Y and vice versa); cognitive or perceptual congruence, which facili-
tates learning; and congruency with broader social or cultural norms (which 
also helps to convey expectations and facilitate learning). Founders' HR 
blueprints for their start-up organizations seem to evidence all three bases of 
consistency. 
For instance, in an organization seeking peer monitoring and in which 
emotional attachments to the organization itself (rather than to one's specific 
work assignment) are sought—perhaps to create goal congruence among dif-
ferentiated subunits—there is a clear technical complementarity with selec-
tion mechanisms that screen for cultural fit and values. The very fact that 
many founders were able to articulate such a clear model or blueprint for 
how they intended to manage human resources is suggestive of the second 
rationale we offered for consistency—namely, the virtues of having a simple, 
coherent and internally consistent image of the employment relationship to 
communicate expectations and entitlements to employees. Although the 
labels 'star', 'engineering', 'commitment' and 'factory' are our own, we think 
they capture nicely the role expectations and treatment that typical employ-
ees in each type of organization are likely to Confront. 
Finally, we suggested that there may be benefits for both the firm and its 
employees when the organization's HR policies resonate with rules, values, 
and codes of conduct that employees have experienced in other social 
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settings. Notice that each of the four pure-type employment models we 
identified resonates with models or behavioral scripts that prevail in other 
contexts. It can hardly be a coincidence, for instance, that the star employ-
ment model, which is espoused particularly by founders of firms developing 
medical technology,3 corresponds so closely to the model that underlies 
employment relations in academia, where many of the founders and key sci-
entific personnel sought for these start-ups are recruited. The commitment 
model draws instead, as we have noted, on familial images, encouraging 
employees to view their associations with the firm in similar terms. The 
engineering model, arguably the default within Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 
1994), dovetails with the socialization that engineers receive in professional 
school and is well suited to the Valley's highly-mobile labor force, placing 
more value on 'cool technology' and technical contribution than on organi-
zational loyalty or elite credentials. Finally, the austere, no-nonsense factory 
model communicates a very powerful and consistent message that employees 
are certain to have encountered elsewhere before: you work, you get paid— 
nothing more, nothing less. 
Given the strong associations among these three dimensions, it is inter-
esting to scrutinize the small number of cases that seem to combine dis-
crepant or discordant foci in the founder's HR model. For instance, one 
founder claimed to be searching for employees based on their long-term 
potential, despite an emphasis on formal organizational control and financial 
remuneration as the basis for attachment. He stated, 'Our main goal is to 
stay lean and flat. I also recognize that you have to be flexible with your 
people'. When asked about the organization of work, this founder replied 
they 'don't have the resources to spend a lot of time getting everyone warm 
and fuzzy . . . we avoid consensus management and everyone knows who 
calls the shots'. Another founder emphasized values as the basis'for selection 
and emotional or familial attachment to the firm as the primary motivator, 
but at the same time espoused a belief in the importance of formal controls. 
This firm is a family business, and it recruits employees primarily from the 
surrounding neighborhood and church community. The founders expected 
employees to be extremely flexible in their work orientation and willing to 
do all phases of the work, including sales, customer support and training. 
However, they also micro-managed die organization, insisting, for example, 
that a salesman who lived in Palo Alto and covered the Palo Alto geographic 
region drive some thirty miles each morning by 8 am to check in the office. 
An interesting question for subsequent research based on these data, after 
we have completed the intended follow-up visits to these companies, is 
* Of the 15 firms in the medial sector (including biomftnolngr), 80% were founded with • star 
model, compared to 16.7% among the remaining firms (x2 - 24.9; df - 1, p < 0.001). 
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whether organizational evolution and performance differ as a function of 
the internal consistency exhibited in firms' initial HR blueprints and 
practices. 
4. Organizational Consequences of Founders' HR Blueprints 
If consistency among HR practices and/or in treatment across different seg-
ments of the work-force is important, then we should detect several forms of 
(indirect) evidence by examining how HR systems evolve in organizations 
characterized by different underlying blueprints or models. First, we would 
expect to see systematic differences among firms, as a function of their initial 
HR models, in the prevalence of certain HR practices and the speed with 
which they were adopted. For example, we would expect that organizations 
embracing a commitment model are most likely (and fastest) to adopt poli-
cies and practices designed to bind employees to the organization (socializa-
tion, communication, etc.) and to undertake investments in the work-force 
(such as training and promotion from within) that are predicated on long-
term attachments. 
Second, it seems reasonable to expect that the HR models would differ in 
the extent to which they encourage versus discourage consistent treatment 
among diverse segments of the work-force. In this regard, the commitment 
model lies at one end of the spectrum, encouraging all employees to identify 
themselves as members of a single corporate family. The star and factory 
models seem most receptive to distinctions among individuals (based on 
ability and/or market forces). Accordingly, we would expect firms founded 
along the lines of the commitment model are less likely (and slower) than 
companies embracing the star or factory model to adopt compensation 
arrangements, job descriptions and other HR practices that differentiate 
among workers. 
We collected data on the timing of the adoption of a broad set of practices 
and procedures related to human resource management. Of course, one pos-
sibility is that a firm has not yet adopted a given practice, in which case the 
record on that practice is right-censored. We use two approaches in analyz-
ing variations in the speed of adoption as a function of the founder's employ-
ment model. One approach emphasizes early adoption, we chose to focus on 
the company's first two years of operation. In this analysis, we distinguish 
firms that adopted a given HR practice or document within the first two 
years from all others (combining both later adopters and non-adopters). The 
advantage of focusing on the early period is that founders' HR models are 
likely to be stable over this short period; the disadvantage is that this form 
of analysis does not take full advantage of the data, ignoring information on 
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Table 3. Effects of Founder's HR Model on Log-Odds.of Implementing Various HR 
Policies and Documents within the First Two Years of Business: Multinomial Logit 
Regressions (• = 69T. 
Variable 
Written puluiinancc 
evaluations 
Regular company-sponsored 
social events 
Regular company-wide 
meetings 
Employee orientation 
program 
In-bouse training 
Mission or values statement 
intellectual property/non-
competition agreements 
Standard employment 
application 
Standard evaluation mrm 
Background checks of 
prospective employees 
Stock options 
Events 
27 
40 
36 
18 
15 
13 
35 
19 
25 
14 
36 
Star 
1.0169 
(1.1144) 
13599 
(1.0629) 
1.1647 
(1.0975) 
10909 
(15923) 
1.4494 
(15173) 
2.8442* 
(1.6785) 
2.1045* 
(1.1771) 
2.5691 
(1.6238) 
1.4246 
(1.1768) 
1.2064 
(1.7563) 
3.8976*** 
(1.5644) 
Engineering 
1.0135 
(1.0260) 
1.3758 
(0.9819) 
1.8047* 
(1.0282) 
2.0114 
(1.4348) 
0.3602 
(1.4314) 
1.2566 
(15911) 
1.5173 
(0.9900) 
2.2708 
(1.5063) 
0.2223 
(1.0978) 
1.6600 
(1.5537) 
2.3204* 
(1.2442) 
Commitment 
0.9731 
(1.0208) 
2.0267** 
(0.9992) 
1.2049 
(1.0346) 
2.3432* 
(1.4428) 
0.3267 
(1.5551) 
0.5934 
(1.6364) 
0.7485 
(0.9775) 
1.9067 
(1.5247) 
0.4829 
(1.1030) 
2.9960** 
(1.5183) 
2.0553* 
(1.2613) 
*Note: effects of six* and industry are not reported; figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
timing within the first two years as well as information on the histories over 
the subsequent years (4.5 years, on average). We therefore supplement these 
analyses with a second approach, which analyzes the complete company his-
tories and distinguishes between non-adopters and adopters. The advantages 
and disadvantages of this strategy are obviously the mirror image of those of 
the alternative. 
Adoption of HR Policies and Documents within the First Two Years 
of Business 
Table 3 reports results based on the first strategy: distinguishing firms that 
adopted particular HR policies and practices with their first two years of 
operation from the others. This Table reports estimates of the effects from a 
series of multinominal logit regressions. The estimated effects reported show 
differences in the log-odds of having adopted various human resource poli-
cies (or produced various HR documents) by the end of the firm's second 
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year in existence. These analyses control for industry (computer hardware 
and software, semiconductors, telecommunications, manufacturing and 
research were included as dummy variables, with medical-related as the 
omitted category) and for the number of employees each firm had by the end 
of its second year of operations. The columns of coefficients reported in 
Table 3 express the net difference in the log-odds of having adopted or 
implemented a given HR practice within the first two years of business 
between those firms founded with a particular HR model (star, engineering, 
commitment) and firms founded with the factory model (the omitted 
category). 
Not surprisingly, it is clear from Table 3 that firms whose founders con-
ceived of employment in factory terms were less likely to adopt virtually 
every type of HR policy and document, relative to otherwise-comparable 
firms that began with a star, engineering, or commitment model.' Accord-
ing to Table 3, firms whose founders espoused a star model of employment 
were considerably more likely to institute intellectual property or non-
compete agreements and stock options within the first two years than other-
wise-similar firms with a different HR blueprint, and the contrast between 
the star and factory categories is statistically significant in both instances. 
(Firms in the engineering and commitment categories are considerably less 
likely to grant stock options than those in the star category, but still signifi-
cantly more likely to do so than firms in the factory category.) Given the. 
dependence of star films on key technical personnel, these findings are quite 
sensible, suggesting that the organization acted quickly to seek to bind their 
key technical employees over the long-term and reduce the likelihood of 
their leaving. 
Star firms were also significantly more likely than those with a factory 
model by having adopted a mission or values statement by the end of the 
second year. This result might suggest an effort to achieve similar ends by 
promoting a distinctive corporate identity very early with which key 
employees could identify. Alternatively, perhaps their need to recruit key 
4
 The precise time at which an organization is 'bom' is hardly straightforward. For the purpose of this 
analysis, a birth dare was defined that corresponded to the earliest evidence of a formal organisation. The 
main denning criteria were: (i) legal incorporation; (ii) having at least one person engaged in the enter-
prise full-time; or (iii) selling a product or service. This definition eliminates the possibility of human 
resource systems or practices being implemented before there was an existing firm. Unfortunately, it also 
complicates the interpretation of effects. Some firms are denned u implementing HR systems when there 
is a single founder working on a business plan that happrns to include a mention of how future employ-
ees will be created, whereas other firms are defined as implementing systems and practices well after 
wnpluym have been hired and products have been sold. 
Note chat a number of coefficients in Table 3 are quite large, but so are their standard errors, due » 
the relatively small sample site and the small number of firms having adopted certain HR practices or 
documents. (Table 3 only reports results for those HR policies and documents that had been adopted by 
ten or more firms within the first ten years.) 
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technical personnel from outside the labor pool of experienced Silicon Valley 
engineers encourages such firms to espouse their mission and values clearly 
to attract the best scientific and technical employees. According to Table 3, 
firms that began with the star model were also the most likely to have pro-
mulgated job descriptions, standard employment applications, and standard 
performance evaluation forms by the end of their second year. Although not 
statistically significant, these results are broadly consistent with the interest 
such firms have in attracting top-flight scientific and technical personnel and 
being able to evaluate who are the stars. Moreover, they might provide man-
agement with a sense of exercising some organizational control over 
autonomous professionals. 
Table 3 also reveals that firms having embarked with a commitment 
model were the most likely to have implemented background checks of 
prospective employees, to conduct formal employee orientation programs, 
and to sponsor regular social events for employees. They are significantly 
more likely to do so than otherwise comparable organizations whose 
founders espoused a factory blueprint for HR. These findings suggest that, 
having created an organization with the intention of creating long-term 
relations with employees, management goes to greater lengths to screen 
prospective hires, is more engaged in formally orienting them to the organi-
zation, and does more to provide for employees' social welfare. 
That we are able to detect differences in the existence of particular 
employment practices so early in the lives of these organizations, and after 
controlling for industry and employment size within the first two years, 
indicates that founders' HR blueprints were not merely rhetoric but instead 
exerted a significant effect on the evolution of employment relations within 
these companies. Moreover, our results suggest that, even within the first 
two years, the HR systems of these organizations are exhibiting complemen-
tarities among particular HR practices. 
Time to Adoption of HR Policies and Documents 
Table 4 looks at the same issue in a slightly different way, which provides us 
with more statistical power to detect differences among the four employ-
ment models. Most organizations in our sample (and, we suspect, in general) 
are not doing a great deal to formalize employment relations within their 
first two years. Consequently, for a number of HR policies and documents of 
interest, there is not much variation in adoption within the first two years 
to be analyzed. In Table 4, we take advantage of each firm's entire history 
and information obtained from surveys and interviews on the timing of 
arious HR practices to examine whether there are significant differences 
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in the speed of implementing various HR practices across the four HR 
models. 
For this purpose, we use event history techniques (Tuma and Hannan, 
1984) to estimate the effects of the founder's HR model (and other covari-
ates) on the rate of adopting the various HR practices and documents listed 
in Table A.6 We specify the underlying process in terms of organizational 
age (/), which we regard as continuous. That is, we regard each firm as 
becoming at risk of adopting each of the HR practices at birth, and we ana-
lyze the (right-censored) distribution of age at the time of adopting.7 Let 
Yk(t) be a random variable that indicates whether a firm has adopted practice 
k at age /, Yk{f)—0 if the firm has not yet adopted and Y^t)— 1 if it has. We 
specify the effects of the founder's employment model (relative to the 'fac-
tory model', which is the omitted category) and of other covariates on the 
(instantaneous) transition rate or hazard as: 
rjf/) = ImPriYfr + A/) « 1 I Yk(t) = 0} (1) 
A/10 A/ 
Table 4 reports estimates of Gompertz models with the following specifica-
tion: 
rk(t) = bh txfcjX t > 0; (2) 
bk = exp{B£k) (3) 
ch = ^{-y*}. (4) 
Here, Bk is a matrix of observations on a set of covariates that are updated 
annually using the standard method of 'spell splitting' (Tuma and Hannan, 
1984). The covariates included are industry dummies and age-varying orga-
nizational size (employee headcount at the start of each year of observation).8 
Before examining how founders' HR blueprints influence the adoption of 
specific HR policies and documents, it is interesting to consider the effects 
of ageing and employment growth. Considering the full set of 25 outcomes 
in Table 4, it is clear that growth in employment dominates organizational 
ageing in determining the rates at which start-up companies adopt HR poli-
cies and documents. Table 4 shows that size has significant effects on the 
rates of adoption for 18 of the 25 practices; each of the significant effects is 
positive. The effects of growth are largest and most often significant for HR 
* Table 4 reports results for chose HR policies and documents chat had been adopted by at least 
twenty firms during their entire histories. 
7
 One firm reported adopting, and then later abandoning written job descriptions. The models pre-
sented in this paper do not account for such reverse transitions. 
' The models were estimated in TDA J.7 (Robwer, 19°4). 
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TABLE 4. Effects of Pounder's HR Model, Size, and Age on the Rates of Adopting Various 
HR Policies and Documents: Gompertz Models (n<*6°T 
Variable 
Written performance 
evaluations 
Organisation chart 
Regular social 
events 
Regular company-
wide meetings 
Employee 
orientation program 
Company-wide 
electronic mail 
In-house training 
Mission or values 
statement 
Employee 
suggestion system 
Newsletter 
Intellectual property/ 
noncompetition 
agreements 
Standardised 
employment 
application 
Standard performance 
evaluation form 
Background checks 
of prospective 
employees 
Personnel manual 
or handbook 
Written fob 
descriptions 
Written affirmative-
action plans 
Human resources 
information system 
Stock options 
Knowledge or skill-
based pay 
Individual incentives 
or bonuses 
Signing bonus 
Profit sharing or 
gain sharing 
Evena 
62 
57 
61 
62 
49 
i
49 
43 
44 
22 
26 
57 
52 
63 
32 
56 
37 
33 
35 
56 
30 
50 
21 
25 
i Star 
0.833 
(0.519) 
0.528 
(0.476) 
1.231** 
(0.520) 
0.784* 
(0.469) 
1.376** 
(0.593) 
1.692*** 
(0.567) 
0.946 
(0.645) 
1.080* 
(0.590) 
0.787 
(0.929) 
1.246 
(0.957) 
1.053** 
(0.489) 
1.396** 
(0.626) 
1.089** 
(0.510) 
0.781 
(0.760) 
0.849 
(0.527) 
0.827 
(0.555) 
1.327* 
(0.696) 
1.279* 
(0.730) 
1.113** 
(0.519) 
0.116 
(0.922) 
0.837 
(0.573) 
1.202 
(0.910) 
1.402* 
(0.845) 
Engineering 
1.191*** 
(0.484) 
0.053 
(0.439) 
0.630 
(0.471) 
0.524 
(0.433) 
0.843* 
(0.497) 
0.549 
(0.515) 
0.885* 
(0.530) 
0.257 
(0.540) 
-0.722 
(0.986) 
1.757** 
(0.753) 
0.494 
(0.442) 
1.048** 
(0.529) 
0.530 
(0.487) 
0.317 
(0.689) 
0.436 
(0.443) 
0.021 
(0.634) 
0.083 
(0.578) 
0.429 
(0.627) 
0.740* 
(0.433) 
1.296* 
(0.753) 
0.490 
(0.482) 
0.731 
(0.839) 
0.349 
(0.795) 
Commitment 
1.191*** 
(0.467) 
0.158 
(0.472) 
1.153*** 
(0.445) 
0.257 
(0.442) 
1.201*** 
(0.493) 
0.805 
(0.498) 
0.963* 
(0.513) 
0.327 
(0.533) 
1.182 
(0.755) 
2.214*** 
(0.797) 
-0.069 
(0.466) 
1.065** 
(0.541) 
0.636 
(0.467) 
1.774*** 
(0.577) 
0.248 
(0.448) 
0.335 
(0.550) 
0.611 
(0.581) 
1.452** 
(0.612) 
0.490 
(0.474) 
2.657*** 
(0.695) 
0.659 
(0.454) 
0.397 
(OJ57) 
1599** 
W48) 
r Size 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.0003 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.0004 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.020) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
Age 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.013 
(0.063) . 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.0001 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.014** 
(0.007) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.026*** 
(0.006) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
TABU 4. (com.) 
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Non-monetary awards 24 -0.399 1.149* 0.129 0.001 0.004 
for performance (0.831) (0.698) (0.684) (0.001) (0.007) 
Group/team incentives 23 0.712 -0.242 0.103 0.003** 0.001 
or bonuses (0.700) (0.748) (0.610) (0.002) (0.007) 
•Note: effects of industry categories are not reported. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
*p<0.10** p<0.05*** p<0.01. 
issues other than compensation, particularly those pertaining to formaliza-
tion and standardization of employment relations and institutionalizing 
means of socialization and communication (regular social events and meet-
ings, newsletters, e-mail, orientation programs, training). Interestingly, the 
effect of growth is non-significant for ail of the items involving individual 
rewards (stock options, skill-based pay, individual bonuses, signing bonuses, 
and non-monetary rewards). However, employment growth does signifi-
cantly increase, the rate of adopting two forms of reward based on groups or 
teams: profit or gain sharing and group- or team-based incentives and 
bonuses. One obvious possible explanation for these results is that increases 
in the scale (and diversity) of employment entail greater potential for free-
riding, as well as more possibility for goal conflict, necessitating group-
based reward systems. Another explanation, not inconsistent with the 
previous one, is that technology firms develop their work-forces by adding 
manufacturing and marketing capacity after having completed the initial 
research and development phase, and the interdependencies among engi-
neering, manufacturing and marketing created by this transition are 
reflected in new compensation arrangements based on group- or company' 
wide performance. 
The effect of time-varying organizational age (ck in equation 4) is statisti-
cally significant for only seven of the 25 HR practices; two of the significant 
effects are negative and five are positive. The practices for which the rate of 
adoption increases with age tend to involve formalization in the purest sense 
of creating documents that specify employment structures and procedures 
and provide organizational 'memory': organization charts, newsletters, per-
sonnel manuals, written job descriptions and written affirmative action 
plans. Irrespective of size, as organizations age they appear less likely to 
adopt intellectual property or non-competition agreements for 'star' employ-
ees or to implement regular company-wide meetings, which seems consis-
tent with the above-mentioned notion of a transition from dominance by 
key engineering personnel in the early years to more interdependence among 
(increasingly specialized) functional areas that include manufacturing and 
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marketing. Overall, Table 4 suggests that employment growth dominates 
aging per u in determining adoption of the sorts of HR practices and proce-
dures that we examined. 
Table 4 reveals significant differences across the four HR models in the 
rate of implementing various employment policies and documents. In fact, 
of the 25 outcomes analyzed in Table 4, there are statistically significant dif-
ferences by founder's HR blueprint for 18 <72%) of them, even after control-
ling for company age and time-varying employment size. The results in 
Table 4 generally corroborate those in Table 3. Table 4 shows that firms that 
began with a factory model were slower to adopt almost every type of HR 
policy or document listed. Bearing in mind that the statistical models in 
Table 4 control for industry and time-varying employment size, this is fairly 
strong evidence of path dependence in the evolution of employment sys-
tems. Table 4 also provides some additional evidence of differences in the 
evolution of HR systems as a function of the founder's blueprint. Relative to 
the factory model, firms whose founders embraced the three other models 
were somewhat faster to develop standardized employment applications, 
performance evaluations, newsletters, HR information systems, employee 
orientation programs, in-house training, social events and/or company-wide 
meetings, and compensation in the form of skill-based pay, profit sharing or 
gain sharing or stock options. (A few of these contrasts vis-A-vis the omitted 
category are not statistically significant.) Given the long-term attachments 
with employees sought through the commitment model, it is hardly surpris-
ing to find that these firms were faster than their factory-model counter-
parts in the same industry and with the same headcount to develop HR 
information systems, formalize performance evaluation, develop various 
policies and documents aimed at internal communication and socializing, 
provide in-house training, tie compensation to accumulated knowledge and 
skill, and share corporate profits or efficiency improvements with the work-
force through profit sharing or gain sharing.9 
Interestingly, a number of the same developmental tendencies are exhib-
ited among firms that embraced an engineering HR model. However, the 
latter firms seem especially inclined to emphasize stock options and non-
monetary recognition awards (both of which seem to be part of the engineer-
ing culture), and, relative to firms espousing the commitment model, they 
were more likely to eschew HR activities that systematize employment rela-
tions and HRM (organizational charts, job descriptions, HR information 
9
 Commitment firms are, as we would expect, also fastest to implement employee voice and participa-
tion policies (suggestion systems, and, in supplementary analyses not repotted in Table 4, quality circles 
and job rotation). However, too few firms have implemented these practices to enable stable and precise 
fsrimarrs of the statistical effects. 
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systems), particularly practices aimed at facilitating equity, consistency and 
a shared identity throughout the organization's entire work-force (profit-
sharing and gain-sharing, affirmative action plans, suggestion $ystemst com-
pany-sponsored social events). In other words, consistent with our 
description of the engineering pure type, there is less evidence of a 'corpo-
rate' focus in the evolution of HR activities in firms that embarked with the 
engineering model; after all, engineers value 'cool technology', not cutting-
edge management philosophies. 
The results pertaining to the star model suggest a pre-eminent focus on 
adopting HR practices in order to facilitate selecting, differentiating, and 
rewarding the firm's stars (and justify this to external partners and 
investors). Consistent with Table 3, Table 4 shows that firms that began 
with a star model were faster than otherwise comparable enterprises founded 
with a factory model of employment to develop intellectual property (non-
competition) agreements and stock options. They were also faster to imple-
ment standardized forms for evaluating performance, which is sensible given 
the focus on rewarding and retaining star performers. That focus might also 
explain several other results for star firms in Table 4. For instance, they 
implemented affirmative action plans at the highest rate; presumably, the 
imperative of identifying and recruiting the most talented individuals, 
whatever their gender or ethnicity, is nowhere stronger than in organiza-
tions embracing the star model. This might also explain their higher rate of 
developing human resource informations systems. 
Several results in Table 4 regarding the star firms might seem less intu-
itive, such as their faster adoption of company-wide electronic mail, com-
pany-wide meetings, social events, mission statements and profit-sharing. 
We noted previously that star firms are often crafted on the model of 
academia, where reliance on e-mail and regular seminars and meetings 
ensures dissemination of the latest research results to colleagues (and where 
affirmative action plans are commonplace and viewed as legitimate). Fur-
thermore, recognizing that these firms are generally in a technology race 
against competitors, with a fairly long lag until results of research can be 
commercialized and obtain regulatory approval, the reliance of these firms 
on such practices as mission statements and profit sharing might serve 
as complements to the stock grants often made to key employees in these 
companies, designed to keep their attention focused on the company's 
long-term strategic objectives and to reward them if those objectives are 
achieved. 
We do not wish to overemphasize these statistical results, which are 
preliminary and certainly not unequivocal. Nonetheless, taken together, we 
believe the evidence we have presented on founders' conceptions of employ-
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ment systems and how those conceptions shape early developments in their 
firms is strongly suggestive of the importance of consistency and comple-
mentarities within HR systems. Moreover, the findings suggest that the rel-
evant unit for transaction cost economizing in designing employment 
relationships and governance structures may vary from organization to orga-
nization. For example, we found some evidence indicating that in enterprises 
embracing a star or factory model, employment practices appear to be tai-
lored to particular work roles or even in some cases to specific key individu-
als. In firms embracing a commitment model, however, HR practices appear 
to promote stronger emphasis on consistent and equal treatment throughout 
the work-force; employment practices and governance regimes seem to be 
tailored not to the exigencies of specific work roles or subunits but instead 
to the needs and interests of the 'family', as a whole. The engineering model 
seems to be intermediate between these two extremes. 
Time to First Full-time Human Resource Manager 
As we have seen, firms in the SPEC sample differ considerably in the degree 
and speed with which they have formalized and elaborated human resource 
management. One event that signals a firm's commitment to elaborate and 
formalize HRM is appointing a full-time manager of human resources. At 
one extreme, some SPEC firms hired experienced human resource managers 
almost at the start; in one firm, it was the fourth employee hired, and in 
another, it was the eighth employee. The founder/CEO of another firm in 
the sample (with 380 employees at the time we interviewed him) reported 
that he has always regarded himself as the firm's HR manager because this 
function is too important to be delegated. At the other extreme, founders 
and CEOs of some other firms reported that they regard HRM as a frill at 
best and, at worst, an impediment to business activity. One founder and his 
administrative assistant handled all HR-related activities until the firm 
exceeded 300 employees. They were forced to employ a full-time personnel 
manager when a major government contract was withheld due to EEOC 
non-compliance. Given this extreme variation, we naturally wondered 
whether initial blueprints or models of the employment relation could 
account for some of the variation in the speed with which companies hired a 
full-time HR specialist. 
We obtained information on the exact date when the first full-time HR 
manager was hired or appointed from within. Figure 2 reports the estimated 
cumulative hazard function for this event as a function of organizational age. 
The rate of hiring the first full-time HR manager increases fairly regularly 
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FIGURE 2. Cumulative hazard function: appointment of first full-time HR manager. 
with age over the whole age range. We tried several specifications of age 
dependence in this analysis. A Weibull model does a reasonable job of sum-
marizing age dependence in the hiring of a full-time HR manager, so we 
estimated Weibull specifications of the form: 
Kt) - Ut~\ (5) 
a « txpKA*\\ (6) 
b = exp®). (7) 
The results appear in Table 5. 
Both age and size have significant effects on the rate of hiring a full-time 
HR manager. The effect of size is complicated but intuitively sensible. Size 
has a significant age-independent effea (in the 'a-vector') and a negative 
age-dependent effect on the rate (in the 'b-vector'). In other words, size mat-
ters most for the youngest firms. Young firms have a high rate of making 
this transition only if they are large; among older firms, size does not make 
much of a difference. Public companies have a significantly higher rate of 
moving to full-time HRM, as do firms engaged in telecommunications/net-
working or medical technology/biotechnology. 
Net of these effects, the founder's employment model has a strong and 
statistically significant effect on the rate of transition to full-time HRM. 
Compared to the omitted factory model, each of the other models has a rate 
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TABU 5. Effects on Rates of Hiring a Full-Time HR Manager Weibull Models (n=67) 
A-vector 
Constant 
Size 
Public company 
Telecom/networking 
Medical technology 
Founder HR model: 
commitment 
Star 
Engineering 
Founder's strategy: 
Technology race 
Technology enhancement 
Hybrid 
Cost 
Non-founder CEO 
B-rector 
Constant 
Siae 
Log-likelihood 
Number of spells 
Number of events 
(i) 
-7.98 
(-7.33) 
0.044 
(3.77) 
0.933 
(1.92) 
.807 
(2.18) 
0.643 
(147) 
2.08 
(2.36) 
2.13 
(2.50) 
2.44 
(2.73) 
0.163 
(1.14) 
-0.007 
(-5.51) 
-314.2 
7193 
67 
(2) 
-7.90 
(-7.70) 
0.047 
'(3.93) 
0.792 
(167) 
1.03 
(2.77) 
0.136 
(0.315) 
0.877 
(1.27) 
1.13 
(1.72) 
0.854 
(1.21) 
131 
(2.38) 
1.13 
(1.95) 
1.54 
(2.41) 
-3.03 
(-1.08) 
0.190 
(1.33) 
-0.006 
(-5.29) 
-305.6 
7193 
67 
(3) 
-7.79 
(-7.42) 
0.047 
(3.87) 
0.818 
(1.68) 
0.994 
(2-58) 
0.112 
(0.253) 
0.711 
(0.987) 
0.967 
(1.41) 
0.760 
(1.05) 
1.20 
(2.10) 
0.990 
(163) 
1.45 
(2.19) 
-3.29 
(-193) 
0.488 
(1.37) 
0.144 
(0.969) 
-0.006 
(-5.25) 
-304.6 
7193 
67 
'Figures in parentheses are /-statistics. 
at least eight-times higher, according to column 1 in Table 3.10 Column 3 
in Table 5 adds an effect for having a non-founder CEO in order to deter-
mine whether departure of the founder precipitates hiring of a full-time HR 
manager (perhaps to implement a new model of employment relations 
10
 As we document in our companion paper (Hannan a si., 1996), there is a strong association 
between the founder's HR blueprint and the business strategy that he or she envisioned. Analyses reported 
in column 2 of Table 5 revealed that firms whose founders intended to compete based on technology 
were significantly fester in hiring a full time HR Manager than those intending to compete based on supe-
rior marketing and/or service, which in turn were aster than those intending to compete based on cost 
minimization. As column 2 reveals the effects of the founder's HR model are weakened substantially (and 
tendered statistically insignificant) after introducing controls for founder's intended business strategy. 
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espoused by the new chief executive). However, according to Table 5, this 
addition does not improve the model fit significantly. 
These results suggest that even taking into account a firm's industry, 
early employment growth, and top executive succession, the founder's HR 
blueprint has a strong independent effect on the speed with which a full-
time HR manager is employed. Companies whose founders espoused a more 
'HR-intensive' blueprint (the star and commitment models) hire HR 
specialists much sooner than otherwise-comparable companies that embark 
with a different employment model, suggesting that their blueprints were 
not mere rhetoric but borne out in practice. 
Methodological Concerns 
We noted above several potential limitations of the SPEC design that should 
be borne in mind in interpreting these results, especially: (i) possible retro-
spective recall bias by our informants; (ii) a potential disjuncture between 
how top management informants characterized HR practices and the reality 
experienced by employees in their firms; and (iii) survivor bias and non-ran-
dom response. We briefly address each of these. 
Recall bias. There is an obvious danger in asking individuals who have 
designed and/or managed companies to reconstruct past events. For instance, 
informants may unconsciously use current practice to infer a model or set of 
principles that guided the organization in its early years, even when none 
existed. Similarly, some HR models and practices may be more socially 
desirable than others, coloring how informants portrayed their firms and 
responded to our interviews. 
Although we obviously cannot rule out entirely the possibility that such 
biases plague our results, we think their likely impact is minimal for several 
reasons. First, in most of the firms we studied (82%), information on the 
outcomes analyzed in this paper—the presence and timing of HR practices 
and documents and a full-time HR manager—came from a different respon-
dent than the person who provided information on the firm's initial strategy, 
HR model, and early history. Second, the results reported in this paper and 
our companion article (Hannan et aJ., 1996) do not differ appreciably if we 
subdivide firms into those in which a single respondent—versus multiple 
informants—provided all of the information on which our analyses were 
based. Third, if recall biases are at work, we would expect to see a difference 
in patterns of association as a function of firm age, with the oldest firms in 
the sample exhibiting the strongest tendency for respondents to selectively 
reconstruct the past. However, supplementary analyses failed to unearth 
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such a pattern. Fourth, we reiterate that respondents were not specifically 
asked (or told) about the three dimensions of human resource management 
on which our taxonomy of models was based, or the specific categories on 
each dimension, or the four HR models we derived.11 Rather, we used open-
ended responses from the interviews to identify these key dimensions and 
categories and to develop the ideal-type HR models. 
Of course, there is always a danger in using information in a sample to 
develop a typology that is then used to 'explain variance' among the same 
observations. For that reason, we have since gathered comparable data for 
another 72 start-up companies, which will enable us in future research to 
cross-validate our taxonomy and findings against this independent sample of 
organizations. 
Management ideology versus employee reality. Our reports of HR 
practice and philosophy were obtained from information provided by 
founders and top managers. The literature on organizational culture has doc-
umented that there is often a large discrepancy between the view of top 
management and the reality experienced everyday by employees (Martin, 
1992), and this may be true in our study as well. However, we would make 
the following points. First, we are interested in understanding what organi-
zational designers were trying to achieve when they created their enterprises 
and how this shaped what subsequently transpired. Therefore, information 
on the intentions of founders and top managers is certainly relevant for this 
purpose. Second, we have documented a strong correspondence between the 
founder's HR blueprint and the types of HR practices and documents subse-
quently adopted by the firm, as well as the speed with which they were 
adopted. This suggests that the founders' HR models were not merely fan-
ciful rhetoric. Indeed, the mere fact that a top management respondent (e.g. 
the senior HR manager) reported that his or her firm has adopted some HR 
practice, such as knowledge-based pay or profit sharing or in-house training, 
does not speak to the experience that employees have within the organiza-
tion. Regrettably, it was not feasible for us to sample employees within each 
of the 172 firms that agreed to participate in the SPEC study. However, we 
have gathered information on important outcomes, such as personnel 
turnover and employee lawsuits, which we will examine in future research to 
cast some light on the employee consequences and perceived legitimacy of 
HR practices within these organizations. 
1
' Nor were respondents presented with the taxonomy of business strategies discussed in our compan-
ion paper and subsequently asked to classify themselves into one category, rather, we developed the tax-
onomy after the fact and assigned firms to particular categories based on information obtained from 
interviews, and , in nuuiy ottCftf from sccoodvy sources (business plans, published articles, etc.). 
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Survivor bias and sample selection. Finally, some readers of earlier ver-
sions of this paper have expressed a concern that despite limiting our sample 
to nascent organisations, we may nonetheless have obtained a sample of 'sur-
vivor' organizations that are atypical in some respects that bear on our 
results or interpretations. We recognize this potential bias; indeed, it was 
precisely the fact of rampant survivor bias in most studies of HR policies 
that prompted us to undertake this study in the first place, so we find a 
certain irony in the criticism. We have attempted to minimize the likeli-
hood of survivor bias in several ways. 
First, as noted above in discussing recall bias, we have conducted separate 
analyses of organizations by age, and we do not find any noticeable differ-
ences between organizations that were founded very recently (e.g. in the last 
four years) versus the rest, as one would expect if the latter group reflected 
some survivor bias. Second, we deliberately oversampled recently-founded 
organizations (see Table 1) in an effort to minimize survivor bias. Third, we 
have augmented the sample of 100 companies analyzed in this paper by 
gathering data on another 72 firms, again deliberately oversampling 
recently-created enterprises in order to minimize the extent of survivor 
bias. By replicating the analyses reported in this paper and in our com-
panion article within that independent sample, we will gain some insight 
into the extent of any survivor bias plaguing our analyses in these papers. 
Fourth, the charge of survivor bias would seem to imply that our sample 
consists of organizations that are relatively stable and that were somehow 
'selected for'. In that context, it is interesting to note that of the 100 organi-
zations we studied in the summer of 1994, 7 have already gone out of 
business or left the Bay Area by May, 1996, and another 14 have either 
merged with or been acquired by another company since the summer of 
1994, suggesting a level of volatility within our sample that does not jibe 
with the notion that ours is a sample of stable 'survivors'. 
Another potential source of bias is the possibility that companies consent-
ing to participate in the first wave of our study are distinctive in ways 
that colored our findings. Recall that we initially invited 250 companies 
to participate, of whom 100 consented to do so. We conducted statistical 
analyses relating the decision to accept or decline our invitation to partici-
pate to employment size, age, and industry. We found little evidence of 
systematic differences between companies that agreed versus declined to 
participate. Similarly, among companies that participated, we were unable 
to detect any non-random pattern in the missing data pertaining to HR 
practice. 
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5. Discussion 
In this paper, we have relied on a unique and rich source of data on early 
organization-building activities in high technology companies to explore 
internal consistency within HR systems. Based on information obtained 
from interviews with founders, we identified four distinct employment 
blueprints, which we termed the star, engineering, commitment and factory 
models. These models reflect, in turn, three interrelated dimensions of the 
employment relationship: the focus of employee attachment and motivation, 
the basis of selection, and the nature of control and coordination exercised 
over the labor force. 
The strong interrelationships among these three dimensions and the 
vividness and clarity of the founder models seem consistent with the claim 
that strong complementarities characterize HR systems. We also found 
other evidence of consistency and complementarities among HR practices. 
For instance, we saw that the propensity of firms to adopt specific HR poli-
cies and documents and hire a full-time HR manager (and the speed with 
which they did so, controlling for their employment size and industry) was 
related systematically to the HR blueprint with which they started. Another 
interesting datum bearing on the consistency theme is the fact that among 
the firms in our sample in which family or friends of the founders) were 
listed as key partners in the creation of the company, five-sixths adopted the 
commitment model, whereas fewer than 30% of firms overall adopted that 
blueprint (p<0.001) (Burton, 1995). In other words, the active involvement 
of family members or friends in the founding process resulted in a firm 
whose employment relationships were structured more along familial lines. 
Of course, the most interesting question is whether consistency makes a 
difference for outcomes that we care about, such as organizational survival 
and performance, labor force turnover, and the like. Is a high degree of inter-
nal consistency at the inception of an organization necessarily a good thing, 
or does this limit the enterprise's ability subsequently to adapt to a chang-
ing environment? The panel aspect of SPEC, which will involve revisiting 
these firms over time, is intended to allow us eventually to address precisely 
such questions. Pending such data, one fruitful line of inquiry is to use the 
retrospective historical data we do have on these companies to examine 
whether their early evolution is influenced in discernible ways by the strat-
egy and HR model adopted at 'birth'. We documented in this paper that the 
founding HR blueprint does exhibit an enduring effect on the evolution of 
HR practices and policies. In our companion paper (Hannan et al., 1996), we 
show not only that the HR blueprints differ in how enduring they are, but 
that founders' initial strategies and HR models have more far-reaching 
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effects, influencing such outcomes as the likelihood of the founder being 
replaced by a new CEO and of the firm going public. These results all sug-
gest considerable path-dependence in organizational development. Even 
more interesting for this paper are Burton's (1995) findings that the 
founder's employment model is a stronger predictor of the firm's current 
HR practices (in 1994) than is the employment model espoused by the cur-
rent CEO, which was measured based on 1994 information!12 This is yet 
another indication that organizational origins matter and that the initial 
premises that guided the design of employment relations exert an enduring 
effect on these companies, even as they grow, mature, and in some cases 
change strategies and top management. 
Given the possibility of survivor and retrospective recall bias in our sam-
ple of organizations (which were selected in 1994 and asked retrospectively 
about their histories), caution is warranted in drawing strong causal infer-
ences from the data we have analyzed. Nonetheless, we believe the SPEC 
sample provides richer and more detailed information on early development 
for a sizeable sample of organizations than any other source of organizational 
data with which we are familiar. As we follow these firms forward over time 
and observe their successes and failures, we will be in a better position to 
assess the implications, if any, of survivor and recall biases on the baseline 
data gathered from these companies in 1994-1996, which were the basis for 
the analyses reported in this paper. 
In closing, we would note that the empirical approach adopted in this 
paper, as well as the particular substantive issues addressed, are very much in 
the spirit of Markets and Hierarchies (Williamson, 1975). Work organization 
and employment relationships have been central objects of focus in 
Williamson's development and elaboration of the TC framework. We have 
utilized the SPEC data to examine the prevailing conceptions of employ-
ment relations among the founders of 100 high tech firms, as well as how 
those conceptions were implemented and shaped the development of human 
resource management within their firms. 
We believe that research along these lines has some potentially important 
implications for transaction cost reasoning. For instance, our analyses indi-
cate that founders bring quite different premises and blueprints to the 
design of employment relations, even founders operating within the same 
industry. Those blueprints, in turn, shape how human resource systems and 
organizational structures evolve within their companies. In short, our find-
ings strongly suggest a human resource system logic' that guides organiza-
11
 Specifically, model* incorporating effects of the CEO'* HR model did not fit is well as comparable 
specifications with effects of the founder's model. 
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tional designers in creating and building their firms, with organizational 
practices and structures evolving concurrently, as part of an interdependent 
system, rather than independently. Results reported in our companion paper 
suggest that these 'logics' change only under great pressure, implying that 
human resource systems may be characterized by 'punctuated equilibria' or 
bursts of radical change followed by small, incremental adjustments. More-
over, the apparent costliness and contentiousness of changing employment 
models should be reflected in increased dissent, turnover, and the like. (It is 
interesting in this connection to note that in SPEC firms that had changed 
their HR model, the current CEO was more likely to cite 'organizational 
and management concerns' and/or 'legal issues' when asked about the major 
challenges facing the company than were CEOs in firms where the HR 
model had remained stable). We will be exploring these issues in future 
research based on this sample of firms. 
We also round some preliminary evidence suggesting that the HR models 
vary in the extent of differentiation in treatment among subgroups of work-
ers, with the star and factory models tolerating, or even encouraging, fairly 
dramatic distinctions among work roles (and, in some cases, among individ-
uals), while the more familial commitment model is at the other extreme of 
minimal differentiation. If borne out by future research, these speculations 
imply that different HR logics entail transaction cost economizing at differ-
ent levels of aggregation—for instance, in 'star' or 'factory' firms, employ-
ment relations may be organized around specific individuals or roles, 
whereas in 'commitment' firms an overarching model of the employment 
relation is intended to apply to most or all employees. 
We also believe our method—gathering detailed information about a 
sample of organizations in their formative years, as a baseline for conducting 
future comparative and longitudinal studies—will eventually prove highly 
valuable for exploring TCE's predictions regarding the determinants and 
consequences of how firms structure work and employment. Interestingly, in 
the final pages of Markets and Hierarchies, Williamson (1975, p. 263) makes 
some suggestions for future empirical research on organizational form, mar-
ket structure, and corporate performance, advocating an approach very simi-
lar to what we have done in studying employment practices: 
The ambitious approach would involve a reconstruction of the history of 
the industry [during the - period when dominance of a specific firm 
emerged], especially during its intermediate stage, for the purpose of 
assessing default and/or chance event failure. This would require that major 
events be reconstructed and critical decisions made by rivals and prospec-
tive entrants be evaluated. 
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